



Directorate of
Intelligence

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Terrorism Review

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1 June 1989

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Terrorism Review ~~63~~

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Terrorism Review

1 June 1989

Focus

Iran and the Radical Palestinians

Iran's cultivation of ties to radical Palestinian groups has become a major element in its turn toward a more militant foreign policy, exemplified by the Rushdie affair. Iranian radicals who now dominate decisionmaking probably view these ties as a means to help Tehran compensate for its international isolation and the flagging of its revolutionary crusade against Iraq and the moderate Arab states. In our judgment, Iran perceives the split between 'Arafat and the Palestinian radicals over acceptance of UN Resolution 242 and Syria's episodic nervousness about being identified with Palestinian extremists as an opportunity to enhance its own role in Middle East affairs by supporting the radical anti-Israeli cause. This policy helps revive Iran's revolutionary credentials at a time that pro-Iranian fundamentalist movements have limited support in most Muslim states.

There is an inherent incompatibility between Iran's Pan-Islamic fundamentalism and the secular ideologies espoused by the radical Palestinians—except for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. They are united, however, on one key point: their explicit opposition to the existence of Israel, a stand on which they differ with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syria, which profess at least the possibility of reaching a political settlement with Israel.

We believe that Iran's support for radical Palestinian groups, particularly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), poses a serious threat to US and West European interests. The alliance places the resources of the most virulently anti-Western Muslim state behind the groups that are most willing to use terrorism to achieve their objectives. Both the PFLP-GC and the Abu Nidal organization (ANO) have experienced operatives, explosives, and a track record of attacks against the United States and Western Europe.

We believe Iranian leaders view these assets as potentially useful beyond retaliation for the Airbus shootdown. Iran prefers using other groups to conduct terrorist operations; since the arrest of Iranian-supported terrorists in France in 1987, Tehran has not displayed the capability to conduct sophisticated operations in the West. Cooperation with radical Palestinian groups offers Tehran the possibility of striking at its enemies while keeping its role relatively hidden—at least enough to reduce substantially the chance that Iran will suffer a retaliatory blow for a terrorist act in which an Iranian role is assumed but not proved.

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We believe that recent developments in Iran have significantly increased the prospect for Iranian-radical Palestinian cooperation in conducting terrorist operations against Western interests:

- Radical leaders have gained the upper hand in the wake of the Rushdie affair, resulting in a rise in Iranian hostility toward the West and Tehran's rejection of significant Western involvement in economic reconstruction.
- Pragmatic Iranian leaders seem to have only a slim chance of reversing the radical tide in the near term. 63

These developments are likely to cause Tehran to be willing to take increased risks in support of terrorism against the West. From their perspective, such operations:

- Provide an outlet for Iranian anger over the Airbus shootdown, over the Rushdie book, and for revolutionary fervor in general. The radicals can claim Khomeini's tacit endorsement for almost any anti-Western operation, even if not directly aimed at Rushdie.
- Give Tehran a weapon at a time when its military and economy are weak and Iran feels vulnerable to foreign pressure.
- Provide a means—by raising tensions with the West—of shifting popular attention away from domestic problems and toward foreign enemies. The theme of a beleaguered Iran standing strong against the anti-Islamic West already predominates in the rhetoric of Khomeini.
- Carry little risk to Iran, since Tehran has already opted for relative international isolation. Iranian radicals probably believe that the chance of Western economic sanctions or military retaliation would be remote. In any event, they believe that the presence of Western hostages in Lebanon will help deter retaliation. 63

The Lebanon Connection

Iran derives practical benefits from its links to the Palestinians, especially in Lebanon. Tehran's Hizballah allies are facing increased pressure from Syria and Amal, the rival Shi'a militia. Syria has tightened its grip around Hizballah strongholds in Beirut, and Amal has expelled Hizballah from much of southern Lebanon. The Iranian-radical Palestinian alliance makes it more difficult for either Syria—which also backs the radical Palestinians—or Amal to attempt an all-out crackdown on Hizballah. Such a move would be more costly for Syria and Amal because some of the radical Palestinian groups might fight on the side of Hizballah—or retaliate against Syrian interests elsewhere. 63

Outlook

We believe Iran's relations with the radical Palestinians will grow. We do not expect a wave of terrorism against the West because of these contacts, but we do believe Iran will be willing to assist some Palestinians in conducting selective operations that might include some spectacular incidents. Iran will want a say in the timing and the choice of targets and will be wary of providing unconditional assistance to support independent operations by the Palestinians. 63

Syria is not likely to prevent increased ties between Iran and radical Palestinian groups based in Syria but will carefully monitor the relationship. Damascus almost certainly perceives benefits from Iranian-radical Palestinian cooperation against

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Israel and 'Arafat and probably would actively support some operations against these targets. Moreover, Syria does not want to jeopardize bilateral ties to Tehran and benefits from Iran providing financial support to some of the groups. Syria is not likely, however, to get directly involved with any Iranian-radical Palestinian terrorist operations against Western targets in the near term. Damascus also will oppose any Iranian attempts to control the groups, fearing that it might lose its ability to prevent operations harmful to Syria's regional goals. [REDACTED] b3

The possibility of terrorism sponsored by Iran and the radical Palestinians will increase if Israel and the PLO are perceived as making progress toward a political settlement. The radicals probably would hope that terrorism would arouse emotions on both sides that would derail the political process. They would view an Arab-Israeli peace settlement as a sellout of the Palestinian cause and therefore would be more willing to take risks to disrupt negotiations if the talks seemed close to a breakthrough. [REDACTED] b3

The political dimension of the Iranian-radical Palestinian alliance will probably expand, given the likelihood of slow progress, at best, toward a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli problem. The slow pace of the Middle East peace process is likely to encourage many Palestinians to believe that 'Arafat's acceptance of Resolution 242 and his dialogue with the United States have failed to advance the Palestinian cause. Under these circumstances, the alliance's hard line probably will appeal to more Palestinians. [REDACTED] b3

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Highlights **b3**

Significant Developments

Western Europe

France

Arrest Warrants for Hizballah Members


On 27 April investigating magistrate Gilles Boulouque issued international arrest warrants for seven Lebanese Hizballah members. All are considered to be closely linked to a series of bombings in Paris in 1986 and have been charged with criminal association, possession of explosives, and complicity in the possession of explosives. French courts will try the accused in absentia. **b3**

Portugal

FP-25 Leader Released

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On 17 May Portuguese authorities released Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho from prison, where he has been held since 1984 on charges of association with the terrorist group Popular Forces 25 April (FP-25). Otelo's release stems from constitutional and procedural questions and does not reflect a judgment of his guilt or innocence on a substantive charge. **b3** a decision has not yet been made whether Otelo's case will be sent back to the appellate court, retried completely, or dropped. **b3** at least 15 of the 47 FP-25 members currently in prison may be released on similar grounds. **b3**

Arrests of FP-25 members in 1984 and 1985 crippled the group, which has not carried out a terrorist attack in recent years. If experienced operatives and leaders are also released on technicalities, FP-25 may attempt a reorganization and resurgence. **b3**



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
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West Germany-Lebanon

Hammadi Conviction

West Germany's conviction of TWA Flight 847 hijacker Muhammad Hammadi on 17 May increases the likelihood of terrorist attacks against German interests. Hammadi was found guilty of participating in 1985 in the murder of US Navy diver Robert Stethem, air piracy, hostage taking, and three cases of serious bodily injury; he was also convicted of smuggling explosives and document forgery. Hammadi was sentenced to life imprisonment and will not be eligible for parole for 15 years, according to press reports. ~~XXXXXX~~ B3

Hizballah is likely to apply terrorist tactics to pressure Bonn to deport him or the state court to pardon him or soften his sentence. 

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Middle East

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Libya-Italy

Libyan Hit Men Convicted

On 2 May a Roman court convicted three Libyans of murdering Jousef Krebesh, the head of the Cairo office of a Libyan dissident group, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), in June 1987. Zaber Zaghoud, who is still at large, was sentenced to 23 years. Said Ali Tardouni and Omar Mabrouk al-Ghammudi were each given 21 years and eight months. According to the prosecution, Krebesh was lured to Rome by a Libyan agent within the NFSL and murdered by Tardouni and al-Ghammudi as Zaghoud waited in a car nearby. Krebesh was the last known dissident killed by Libyan agents; however, we believe Tripoli continues to watch antiregime exiles and plan their execution. ~~SECRET~~ b3

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
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


Africa

Angola

Aeroflot Hijacking Fails

A white South African attempted to hijack an unscheduled Aeroflot flight ferrying African National Congress (ANC) insurgents from Luanda to Dar es Salaam, according to an eyewitness account. The hijacker, who brandished a grenade and had additional explosives stored in accessible luggage, was overcome by passengers and crew. Although his objectives are unknown, he may have been a disaffected ANC member or a South African agent intent upon diverting the aircraft to South Africa. Security screening procedures on boarding may have been lax.



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Western Europe: Debating Internal Border Controls

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The European Community (EC) Commission is pushing ahead with efforts to dismantle the Community's internal borders by the end of 1992; EC members, however, are divided on the issue. Some—~~██████████~~—oppose the process or significant aspects of it; among those who favor the Commission's efforts, some are likely to go much further than others in simplifying, if not completely removing, internal border controls. Disagreements are particularly intense—over policies on extradition, asylum, and visa requirements for non-EC countries. Although the abolition of the EC's internal borders is unlikely to be accomplished by the end of 1992, the process of working toward that goal is likely to encourage cooperation in policing the EC's external borders. ~~██████████~~ 63

Origin of the Debate

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The EC's plan to remove internal borders derives from the Single European Act (1985) requirement for free movement within the Community—part of the program to create a single market by the end of 1992. The EC Commission's directive on "open borders" in 1985 identified physical barriers at customs posts, immigration controls, passports, searches of personal baggage, and police identity checks as unnecessary obstacles. Although the Commission expressed concerns over the dangers posed by terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime, it argued that internal border controls were not the only or even the best solution to these problems. The Commission conceded, however, that such controls could be abolished only if the EC "strengthened external frontiers" and enhanced "cooperation between the relevant national authorities." ~~██████████~~ 63

Proponents of Abolition

EC Commissioner for the Internal Market Martin Bangemann has pressed for abolishing internal borders. Following the first meeting of a group of "national coordinators" established by the EC to address problems arising from removing the controls, Bangemann announced that common policies covering asylum, extradition, and visas could be in place by

Western Europe's Extradition Law

The foundation for much of Western Europe's extradition law is found in two conventions—the European Convention on Extradition (1957) and the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977). Both accords were drafted in the 23-member Council of Europe (COE). ~~██████████~~ 63

The Convention on Extradition

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~~██████████~~ obligates signatories to surrender all fugitives wanted by the requesting state, provided that the offense is punishable by at least a one-year jail term in both of the countries involved. The Convention is generally regarded as superseding existing bilateral extradition treaties, but the signatories are free to conclude bilateral treaties that expand but do not contradict the Convention's provisions. In addition, each state is allowed to extradite its own nationals if it chooses, an option that was usually forbidden in earlier extradition treaties. The Convention's usefulness, however, is limited by Article 3, which allows a state to refuse extradition if it concludes that the crime in question was politically motivated—a justification known as the political offense exception. ~~██████████~~ 63

The Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism has been signed by all COE members except Finland, Ireland, Malta, and San Marino. It lists crimes that cannot be treated as political offenses and that are therefore subject to extradition. The crimes are specified as those that are "extremely violent" or involve a "grave danger" to human life. Under the Convention, each state may still deny the extradition of individuals charged with such crimes but is obliged to submit those suspects for prosecution in its own judicial system. ~~██████████~~ 63

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b3 late 1989. He tried to placate opponents by indicating that spot checks by mobile customs units could be used at border crossings. [REDACTED] the EC Commission believes that agreement in these areas would give momentum to the plan to abolish internal borders, which has been lagging behind the other aspects of the single-market project. [REDACTED] b3

Bangemann is supported by Spain, which holds the EC presidency until July 1989. Madrid has moved beyond Bangemann's measured approach. [REDACTED]

b1, b3 As EC president, Madrid chairs the Trevi group—the Community's main forum for counterterrorism coordination—and at a recent unofficial meeting of the Trevi ministers pressed for accelerating the abolition of internal border controls. However, [REDACTED] b3

[REDACTED] Madrid encountered polite but adamant opposition to many of its proposals based on concerns over terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and national sovereignty. [REDACTED] b3

Support for removing internal border controls also comes from the Schengen group. [REDACTED] b1, b3

One of the group's original goals was to eliminate the controls on their shared borders by 1990 to spur the EC into meeting its 1992 deadline. The Schengen group has made more progress than the EC has in loosening or eliminating border checks. The five countries, for example, give only a cursory check to their citizens at border crossings, and the Schengen treaty calls for EC citizens' vehicles to display a green sticker on the windshield to allow a simple sight check. The Schengen group has also expedited transit of goods at borders. Like the EC, however, it has yet to devise a common visa policy, harmonize drug- and gun-control laws, or draft a uniform policy regarding "hot pursuit" by police across national borders. Even if the Schengen group is successful in harmonizing its visa requirements and asylum procedures, we believe it will be difficult for the EC—which comprises more states with more diverse concerns—to use the result as a model. [REDACTED] b3

The Opposition

[REDACTED] Greece and the Netherlands, oppose the complete dismantling of internal border controls. [REDACTED] b3 they contend that total abolition would facilitate terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. [REDACTED] b1, b3

Police and customs authorities in several EC member countries also oppose ending internal border controls. [REDACTED] French customs and police officials recently warned that eliminating internal border controls would cause "security gaps." [REDACTED] b1, b3

[REDACTED] cope with an EC-wide abolition of internal borders by simply posting their security checks a few kilometers back from the frontier. [REDACTED] concerned that users of "soft drugs" will take advantage of the lack of border controls to smuggle drugs from EC countries such as the Netherlands that have liberal drug laws. [REDACTED] b3


Other Factors

Another complication that may influence the EC's debate on border controls is Denmark's membership in both the EC and the Nordic Council. [REDACTED] b3 Copenhagen intends to remain in the Nordic Passport Union, which allows individuals to move among Denmark and four non-EC states—Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland—with few or no passport checks. An EC agreement on external border controls with all five Nordic countries is unlikely. [REDACTED] More- b3 over, if Copenhagen retains its membership in the Passport Union, the EC will find that what is, in effect, Denmark's external border will be beyond its

¹ Despite its growing concern about the security implications of abolishing internal borders within the Schengen group states, the Netherlands has supported the group's efforts. The Hague, however, is less supportive of EC efforts to do so. [REDACTED] b3

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control. Complicating the issue further, the Nordic Council's security services are worried that terrorism and drug trafficking will spill over from the EC, and they might insist that Denmark maintain some frontier controls with its EC partners. **b3**

Outlook

The EC Commission and the Spanish EC presidency—as well as its French and Irish successors—will continue working to dismantle internal borders, a process they see as essential to the creation of a genuine single market. They will argue that bilateral and EC-wide cooperation is more effective than national border controls for fighting crime. The single-market project's requirement for abolishing internal border controls probably has contributed to the growth in regional cooperation—especially under the Trevi group—on terrorism and drug trafficking; the growth has been evident since 1986. **b3**

Nonetheless, the advocates of a borderless EC are probably underestimating the obstacles to agreement on uniform rules for extradition, visas, and asylum—the essential precursors to border dismantling by the end of 1992:

- EC members almost certainly will continue to disagree over extradition policies and requests. Ireland, for example, recently refused to extradite suspected IRA supporter John Ryan to the UK because Dublin believed he would not get a fair trial.
 - The EC has made little progress on creating a comprehensive list of countries whose nationals will require visas to enter the EC. Most countries now on the list were subject to visa requirements before passage of the Single European Act. Additional debate on visa and asylum requirements is likely to spark controversy as EC members seek exceptions for former colonies and those nations in which they are seeking to acquire or maintain political or economic influence.
- b1, b3**

External Border Controls

The debate over dismantling internal border controls is fueling Community efforts to strengthen the EC's external borders. **b3**
the EC Commission has called for the creation of a cordon sanitaire around the perimeter of the 12-member states to intercept terrorists, drug traffickers, and illegal immigrants. **b1, b3**

The EC's Trevi group views the strengthening of external borders as one of its most important objectives. The group is forming a subgroup named Trevi 92 to handle the security problems that are expected to follow the abolition of the Community's internal borders. Trevi 92's tasks probably will include:

- Reinforcing the EC's external borders by establishing common policies and enforcement practices for each nation's border guards.
 - Creating a central West European data base on terrorists and drug traffickers.
 - Completing a communitywide lookout list that would include names of diplomats expelled from EC countries for terrorism-related activities as well as the names of suspected terrorists.
 - Encouraging increased exchanges of information between and among law enforcement agencies of the EC states. **b3**
- b1, b3**

increasing criticism by police and customs officials, and the public's eagerness for action against drug trafficking almost certainly will slow progress toward ending all controls. Until an efficient plan for policing external borders is devised, many West Europeans will believe that at least some internal border controls are indispensable. As a result, many internal border controls are likely to remain in place at the end of 1992. **b3**

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
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
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
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
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
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The Kurdish Workers' Party: On the Defensive **b3**

The level of violence by the Marxist-Leninist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK)—the most militant Turkish Kurdish organization—in Turkey and other West European countries has declined since 1988. Ankara's efforts against the PKK in southeastern Turkey, the loss of PKK operational bases in Iraq, and decreased support from the local population have apparently contributed to the downturn.

b1, b3 [redacted] The PKK's ability to return its terrorist and insurgent operations to at least pre-1988 levels will depend on how much support it obtains from state sponsors and the Kurdish community and on whether Turkish and other West European security efforts against the group continue. The same factors probably will determine whether the PKK continues its current targeting patterns or shifts to new ones—possibly to include the United States and other perceived supporters of Turkey. **b3**

Curbed Activities in Turkey

b1, b3 [redacted] casualties resulting from PKK activities in Turkey are declining. [redacted]

[redacted] the total number of civilian deaths for which the PKK was responsible fell to 112 in 1988 from 221 in 1987. Other sources indicate a more significant drop, with civilian deaths totaling only 65 in 1988 compared with 228 in 1987. Although statistics on the total number of PKK-related incidents in 1988 vary in reliability, they all demonstrate a significant drop from 1987 figures; official Turkish figures indicate a 26-percent decline. **b3**

b1, b3 Changes in the PKK's tactics probably played a major role in the decline in PKK-related civilian casualties. [redacted] the group's massacres of civilians in isolated villages in southeastern Turkey in 1987 belied its self-proclaimed mission to combat oppression, alienated villagers, and drew criticism from other Kurdish groups and from PKK sympathizers and activists. **b3**

b1, b3 [redacted] Ankara's tactics against the PKK have also changed since Hayri Kozakcioglu became the first regional governor of the 11 southeastern provinces in July 1987; these changes probably have contributed to the decline. **b1, b3**

Kozakcioglu, who is in charge of coordinating security, has used his authorized extraordinary powers to:

- Reorganize the gendarme forces into commando units supported by village guards and specially trained police units.
- Deploy these units in rural areas, where the PKK is most active.
- Improve weapons training, communications systems, and counterinsurgent tactics, including greater use of helicopters.
- Increase interagency intelligence gathering and operational cooperation against the PKK.
- Encourage PKK members to take advantage of a repentance law, which offers a pardon and reward to PKK militants who cooperate with the government. **b3**

[redacted] These measures and the defection of a number of PKK members have hurt PKK capabilities and morale. **b1, b3**

[redacted] the new tactics increasingly forced the PKK to engage Turkish security forces in skirmishes—but with less success than previously. **b1, b3**

[redacted] 100 PKK guerrillas died in combat in 1988 compared with 81 in 1987. In contrast, [redacted] Turkish security forces' fatalities declined to 52 last

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year from 59 in 1987, despite the increased number of armed clashes. The declining casualties probably reflect improved training, equipment, and tactics. The PKK has attempted to counter the government's efforts to exploit internal strains by retaliating against defectors and their families; nevertheless, [REDACTED] PKK adherents continue to desert.

b1, b3
[REDACTED] the PKK's combat losses—many of whom were seasoned veterans—have been hard to replace and that the group's morale is suffering. [REDACTED] that the PKK continues to kidnap recruits, suggesting that the group still has problems attracting new members. [REDACTED]

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Ankara has also hampered PKK attempts to expand operations to Turkey's larger cities. [REDACTED] Turkish police arrested 25 alleged PKK members last August who were involved in terrorist activities in the Izmir region. In January Turkish security officials captured a number of PKK members attempting to form an infrastructure in Istanbul and had begun keeping others under surveillance in Ankara. [REDACTED]

b3
An additional element of Ankara's program against the PKK is an effort to facilitate cultural assimilation and promote economic development in the southeast. This tactic includes establishing provincial universities, expanding communications and electric power networks, and constructing large-scale economic projects such as a system of dams on the Euphrates River. [REDACTED]

b3
Ankara's economic and cultural measures have produced mixed results, however. [REDACTED] Ankara's cultural measures—especially television broadcasts—have accelerated an assimilation process that has begun to narrow the gap between the more developed western region of Turkey and the less developed eastern region. The assimilation process, however, may be encouraging a movement within the Kurdish community to preserve its ethnic identity.

The government's economic policies, requiring the resettlement of thousands of Kurds away from project construction areas and future reservoir sites, have disrupted village life. [REDACTED] Such dislocations have created an atmosphere of distrust and dissatisfaction toward the government and probably have generated new recruits and other support for the PKK from within the Kurdish community. [REDACTED]

Other Factors Contribute to Decline

Other developments over the past year have added to the PKK's woes and forced it to relocate some activities. The cease-fire between Iran and Iraq since last summer has enabled Baghdad to reestablish control over its border with Turkey by shifting troops from the war zone, increasing border patrols, and concentrating its forces against Iraqi Kurds who had fought on the Iranian side. [REDACTED]

b3
This action forced at least 60,000 Iraqi Kurds to flee to Turkey—about 37,000 of whom remain there. As a result, the PKK has lost its safehavens and logistic bases in Iraq, and bringing arms, supplies, and personnel into Turkey has become more difficult. [REDACTED] Increased Iraqi patrols also have forced the PKK to shift its action away from provinces near the Iraqi border—Hakkari, Siirt, and Mardin—to provinces nearer the Iranian border. [REDACTED]

b3
[REDACTED] PKK-related incidents in the provinces of Van, Kars, Agri, and Erzurum increased last year. [REDACTED]

The PKK reportedly experienced internal strains in 1988, and we believe they continue to limit the group's effectiveness. [REDACTED]

b3
[REDACTED] approximately 10 senior PKK members led by PKK spokesman Husayn Yildirim formed a faction opposed to Ocalan and his leadership style. Other reporting suggests Ocalan's wife, Central Committee member Kesire Yildirim, allied herself with this faction. [REDACTED] the oppositionists' goals were to replace Ocalan with Husayn Yildirim, to intensify the PKK's armed struggle without killing women and children, and to enhance contacts with all

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b1, b3

"revolutionary forces." As of November, however, the faction had been unable to pursue its goals; the leading activists allegedly went underground after Ocalan issued death sentences against them, and their supporters were too intimidated to act. [REDACTED] b3

Outlook

The PKK will probably have to adjust its tactics to surmount the obstacles that have recently surfaced:

- *Finding new bases.* Fragmentary reporting suggests that the PKK already has begun to rely more on Iran—probably with Tehran's approval—as a safe-haven to replace its bases in Iraq; the PKK's ability to combat Turkish security measures probably would increase should Iran choose to provide other support to the group. The PKK probably can expect continued support and safehaven from Syria, which regards the group as a lever over Turkey on bilateral issues. Damascus in the past has been the PKK's principal supporter, providing funding, training in the Syrian-controlled Al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley) in Lebanon, and safehouses on which the group has relied heavily.
- *Replacing lost personnel.* The Iraqi actions against Kurds in northern Iraq and the resulting large numbers of Kurdish refugees in Turkey may prove a blessing for the PKK. According to consular reporting, Turkish security forces worry that these refugees—many of whom are experienced fighters—could become a source of manpower for the PKK. The group's success in recruiting them will depend in part on its ability to set aside ideological differences.
- *Circumventing West European security measures.* The PKK probably will have to decide how to continue its activities in Western Europe without drawing further fire [REDACTED] or causing similar problems in other countries. The group may choose to terrorize host governments attempting to curb its activities. [REDACTED] b1

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Should it become desperate for publicity and support from the Kurdish exile community, the group may choose to mount high-profile attacks against perceived supporters of Turkey—possibly including the United States—despite fears of a security backlash from host governments.

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Chronology of Terrorism—1989 ~~b3~~

Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists or the use of terrorist tactics. These events have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included. ~~b3~~

Western Europe

2 May

Turkey: Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) terrorists attack seven minibuses near Erzurum. Five people were killed. ~~b3~~

4 May

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5 May

Turkey: Police arrest 39 Dev Sol members in Ankara in four successful operations. ~~b3~~

7 May

Spain: Bomb explodes and severely damages the Barcelona headquarters of the Catalan separatist Defense of the Earth movement. ~~b3~~

8 May

Spain: Car bomb kills two policemen. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) members are being held. ~~b3~~

9 May



Middle East

5 May

b1, b3

11 May

~~Secret~~

15 May

b1, b3



16 May

Lebanon: Car bomb in West Beirut kills the leader of Lebanon's Sunni Muslim Community, Sheikh Hassan Khaled, and several other persons. No group has claimed responsibility. b3

Latin America

2 May

El Salvador: Unknown terrorists throw two bombs at US Embassy warehouse in San Salvador, causing some damage but no injuries. b3

3 May

El Salvador: Four people killed and 23 wounded by mine in La Herradura jurisdiction, La Paz Department. The victims set off the mine when they removed a sign left by guerrillas. b3

Dominican Republic: Bomb is thrown at a school playground in Santo Domingo, damaging a wall. No one was injured. b3

Colombia: Ten National Liberation Army (ELN) terrorists attack and rob a toll booth at El Playon, Santander Department, killing two police officers. Four more officers were killed and seven were wounded in an ambush while they were chasing the 10 terrorists. b3

4 May

Peru: Peasants from 15 communities beat to death seven Sendero Luminoso (SL) terrorists in Ayacucho Department. The peasants were retaliating for having their cattle stolen. b3

6 May

Peru: Suspected SL terrorists kill American Popular Revolutionary Alliance deputy Pablo Li Ormeno. Two gunmen shot the victim in his car. b3

8 May

Peru: SL terrorists kill two policemen and injure four during attack on mining center in Pasco Department. b3

9 May

El Salvador: Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) sabotages national electrical system, leaving 40 percent of country without electricity. b3

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

10 May

Chile: Two individuals, armed with automatic weapons, intercept bus, force passengers off, and set it on fire in Santiago. They left pamphlets from the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front and Lautaro extremist group. b3

Peru: Son of Huanta mayor is killed by three SL terrorists. The victim was shot in the head. b3

Peru: Unknown terrorists attack house of former police doctor, damaging his car. The terrorists threw a stick of dynamite from a moving car. b3

11 May

Peru: Terrorists attack police station in San Mateo, injuring four national policemen and seriously damaging the station. The SL is presumed to be responsible. b3

15 May

Argentina: Parcel bomb explodes at bookshop in Cordoba area, seriously injuring owner—son of the Justice of the Peace—and his wife. The device was presumably sent to them from a printing shop. No group claimed responsibility. b3

18 May

Chile: Terrorists in Santiago armed with automatic weapons attack two policemen, causing serious injuries. The assailants stole the policemen's weapons and communications gear. b3

South/East Asia

28 April

b1, b3

30 April

India: Terrorists throw three bombs at train in Assam State, seriously injuring three persons. Police suspect Bodo militants. b3

10 May

India: Bomb explodes in crowded bus yard in Srinagar, killing one person and injuring six. Authorities suspect Muslim militants. b3

Philippines: Bataan military captures one of the prime suspects in ambush-slaying of US military officer on 21 April. The suspect admits being an NPA member but denies participating in the killing. b3

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Africa

5 May

South Africa: Unknown persons attack Potsdam police station in Ciskei, killing one policeman, injuring one other person, and causing minor damage. b3

7 May

South Africa: Bomb damages home of nominated National Party official in Randfontein. This was the first attack on a home of a white member of parliament; the explosives used were not typical of leftwing terrorists' devices. b3

8 May

Angola: Bomb explodes at offices of three foreign oil companies in Luanda, injuring two persons. b1, b3

The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola claimed responsibility. b3

Mozambique-Italy: Members of Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) release Italian missionary in Blantyre, Malawi. The priest was kidnapped in late March during a rebel attack in which eight soldiers and three other Capuchin missionaries were killed. b3

10 May

South Africa-Belgium: Helene Pastoors, Belgian-Dutch dual national imprisoned in South Africa since 1986 for "high treason," is released and returned to Brussels. Pastoors—convicted of assisting the African National Congress (ANC) in ferrying arms, identifying targets, and establishing explosive caches—signed a document renouncing terrorism and agreed not to return to southern Africa. In exchange, Brussels permitted the return of three South African diplomats expelled in early 1988. b3

12 May

South Africa: Supreme court in Transkei sentences two ANC members to death for limpet mine explosion at casino in 1986, killing two persons. b3

14 May

Mozambique-Zambia: RENAMO members kill four Zambian civilians, including three children, in attack on Petauke village, near Mozambican border. b3

16 May

South Africa: Court finds Barend Strydom, self-proclaimed leader of radical rightwing group, White Wolves, guilty of murder and attempted murder. He was arrested last November after killing six blacks during a shooting spree in downtown Pretoria and sentenced to hang. b3

~~Secret~~